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Uganda still lags way behind in its tax collections at the domestic level. For most of the 
commodities the tax collection effort is not more than 5 percent relative to the statutory 
rate of 18 percent. This results into a situation where the government has to rely a lot on 
foreign financing. From the analysis, there is a lot of improvement where URA can be 
able to increase its tax effort. This could be achieved by targeting commodities that are 
under-taxed and excluding food items for equity purposes. Increasing domestic tax 
collection would also result into less overreliance on taxing a few commodities 
especially fuel which is interlinked with a lot of other sectors and could indeed harm 
growth in the long-run. We also find that the tax effort on imports is sufficient. However, 
import duties on fuel remain very high and this could be a symptom of the poor 




Building the capacity of low-income countries to mobilize more tax revenues is now 
at the top of the development policy agenda. One of the objectives of the tax reform 
agenda is to improve the efficiency of the tax administration itself. Uganda has 
initiated several tax reforms to address the fiscal challenges. There has been a 
concerted effort to widen the tax base to the extent that the financing of the budget 
shifts away from foreign to domestic financing while there has been some significant 
improvement in the collection of revenues (from a dismal 6.5 percent of GDP in 
1989/90 which led to large deficits and a budget mainly funded by external financing 
to 13 percent in 2007). The remarkable growth in tax revenue was a result of policy 
measures that included restructuring the tax system/administration, particularly the 
establishment of the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) in 1991. 
 
While this growth is commendable, the tax revenues collected remain way much 
below the required financing to support the budget, with about 31 percent of the 
budget still financed from external sources. This makes the economy vulnerable to 
the actual realization of the funds obtained in addition to the political influence that 
comes with the providers of such funds. The purpose of this study is to explore ways 
how the government can expand its tax base and the implications of these 
measures. 
 
Previous studies have mainly focused on the incidence of taxes on households 
(Bahigwa et.al., 2004, and Okidi et.al., 2004). There is established consensus that 
some taxes have had a negative impact on income distribution due to their 
regressivity. This was one of the justifications for the abolition of the graduated tax 
and replacing it with the local service tax.  While the progressivity of the tax system 
is now well documented, there is not much analytical work that has been done to 
assess how the government can expand its resource envelop. 
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The tax base can be expanded in two ways. First, the government can target the 
sectors that are currently untaxed especially the informal sector. This can be 
implemented for example, by introducing presumptive taxes based on the activities 
of these sectors. To the extent that the informal sector is where the bulk of the poor 
are employed, this choice has to be implemented while minimizing the regressive 
and distortionary effects on the sector. The second alternative is to minimize tax 
evasion.  
 
The objective of this study is to assess how these two approaches can be 
implemented without necessarily leading to a higher tax burden that would be 
regressive and distortionary. The study is particularly interested in the general 
equilibrium effects of widening the tax base, reducing tax evasion on the various 
sectors of the economy. With increased revenue mobilization, this would also reduce 
the burden of financing using domestic resources and the associated crowding out 
effects. There are arguments that indeed having a narrow tax base could lead to 
higher taxes on a few commodities which results into tax evasion. The model will be 
simulated to assess the benefits of reducing the tax burden on some activities while 
introducing taxes on new activities. The next two sections present the background to 
the tax problems in Uganda and literature review on the effects of tax evasion, 
particularly the effects of tax evasion.  
 
2.          Background 
 
Due to the turbulences that characterized most of post-independence Uganda, tax 
collections have historically been low. For example, the tax to GDP ratio that stood 
at 12.6 percent in 1970-71, had declined to a dismal 6.5 percent by 1989/90, leading 
to large deficits and a budget mainly funded by external financing (Ayoki, et.al. 
2004). Revenue performance has since improved, peaking at a tax/GDP ratio of 
15.8 percent in 2006/07 before declining slightly to 13.1 percent in 2007/2008 
(Figure 1 and Table 2). A number of policy initiatives explain this impressive 
performance, all of which were meant to streamline the administration of tax 3 
 
collection and to expand the tax base. The most notable policy changes include the 
establishment of the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) in 1991, the replacement of 
sales tax with VAT in 1996, the introduction of the new income tax structure in 1997, 
in which personal income tax rates were reduced, and the replacement of tax 
holidays with tax concessions in 1999. In spite of these changes and the 
tremendous progress made in the tax collection efforts, the 2007/08 tax to GDP ratio 
was still below the Sub-Saharan Africa average of about 20 percent. Part of the 
problem is that a large section of the economy is untaxed, especially the informal 
and the commercial agricultural sectors, which complicates efforts to widen the tax 
base and increase domestic revenue. 
 
Consequently, the tax burden has for long been falling on only a small section of the 
population that is either in formal employment or own businesses for which tax 
assessment is easier. It is estimated that the top 35 highest tax payers in the country 
alone account for about 50 percent of all the tax revenue, an indication of how 
narrow the tax base is in the country. This narrow tax base is also aggravated by the 
high levels of tax evasion and corruption in the tax administration system. The 
aggregate outcome of these shortcomings is a low growth in domestic revenue 
compared to the expenditure needs of the growing Ugandan economy. The contrast 
between revenue and expenditure highlights a serious financing problem for the 
country that necessitates the use of external financing to cover the resultant budget 
deficit. For example whereas in 2007/08, the share of total government expenditure 
to GDP was 17.1 percent, that of revenue to GDP was just 13.5 percent (Figure 1 
and Table 2).. Moreover this fiscal deficit has been increasing, from about 6.5 
percent in 1997/98, peaking at 13.6 percent in 2001/02, before falling to 7.5 percent 
in 2007/08, due to the various debt forgiveness initiatives and the commitment of the 
government to finance most of the budget by domestic revenues. 
  
But much needs to be done if the government is to realize its goal of reducing 
external financing, especially in the area of diversification of tax sources. However, 
records from URA show that a small number of taxes still dominate the tax structure. 4 
 
For example, more than a third of total tax collected in 2006/07 was from Pay as You 
Earn (PAYE) and excise duty, while more than 50 percent of all the excise tax was 
collected from petroleum products (Table 2).   
 
Fig.1:  Changes in Selected Revenue Performance Indicators 2000/01-
2007/2008 
 
       
 Also to note is the large share of the taxes that are levied on international trade (an 
estimated 50 percent of total taxes), an indication of the under performance of the 
domestic taxes, at only 8 percent of GDP in 2007/08 (Fig. 1). Most of the domestic 
sectors of the economy are grossly under-taxed, for example the property taxes 
made up less than 1 percent of the total taxes in 2006/07.  It is conceivably possible 
that this high tax burden on a small section of the population may be to blame for the 
high levels of tax evasion in Uganda. Gauthier and Reinikka, 2001 estimated that in 
1997 about 46 percent of firms in Uganda were evading at least one of the main 
taxes, a high level of tax evasion that is not thought to have reduced, with possibility 
that it could have even increased. Therefore expansion of the tax base and stopping 






















































































































































Table 1: Percentage Share of Type of Tax in the Overall Central Government 
Tax Collections, 2002/03-2006/07  
      2002/03 2003/04 2004/05  2005/06  2006/07
1.    Central Government Taxes  100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00
          Taxes on Income, Profits ,and Capital             
          gains  24.68 24.60 27.71  25.70  26.32
               PAYE (Payable by individuals)  12.07 11.44 12.27  13.22  13.21
               Corporations and Other Enterprises  6.81 7.90 8.82  8.48  8.87
               Unallocatable  5.81 5.26 6.62  4.00  4.23
         Taxes on property  0.43 0.35 0.29  0.28  0.27
               Immovable property  0.43 0.35 0.29  0.28  0.27
         Taxes on goods and services  74.88 75.06 71.99  74.02  73.41
              General Taxes on goods and             
               services(VAT)  37.28 33.33 33.12  33.63  32.60
                      Imported goods  19.74 19.57 18.16  18.46  18.09
                      Local goods  8.85 7.31 7.49  8.45  8.71
                      Local services  8.69 6.45 7.47  6.72  5.80
          Excise  Taxes  27.56 25.64 24.77  24.37  23.62
                  Petroleum  16.65 15.41 15.50  16.46  15.26
                  Other imports  2.80 2.88 2.46  1.06  1.02
                  Local goods  8.12 7.34 6.80  6.85  7.34
        Taxes on permission to use goods or             
        perform activities  2.91 9.05 9.88  14.47  14.17
                  Motor vehicle taxes  2.17 2.39 2.53  2.72  2.65
                  Other  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.01  0.01
              Custom duties(other imports)  0.72 6.65 7.33  11.74  11.51
        Other Taxes  7.14 7.04 4.22  1.55  3.02
              Government procurement  0.91 0.68 0.78  0.72  0.74
              Other  6.23 6.36 3.45  0.83  2.28
            Source: Uganda National Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) 7 
 
  3. Literature  Review 
 
A survey of the literature reveals that no study has explicitly incorporated the general 
features a model should have in order to capture the fundamental aspects of the 
incidence of tax evasion. In Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) portfolio approach to 
tax evasion, individuals weigh the probability of getting caught and paying a penalty 
against the probability of being able to keep the evaded income. According to the 
portfolio approach therefore, the individual evader benefits by keeping the evaded 
income in its entirety.  
 
Martinez-Vazquez (1996) contends that the conclusions drawn from the 
conventional portfolio approach to tax evasion regarding the incidence of tax evasion 
are rather unsatisfactory. The author argues that the portfolio approach ignores the 
fact that in numerous situations, particularly those in which the expected value is 
positive, tax evasion is comparable to a tax advantage in the law. Consequently, it 
would be rational to expect replication and competition, when possible, to work 
toward the elimination of this direct advantage. Martinez-Vazquez (1996) argues that 
this process of adjustment should generally take place through changes in the 
relative prices of both commodities and factors of production.
1 However, the portfolio 
approach affords tax evasion incidence analysis only a partial equilibrium treatment 
and does not capture this general equilibrium effect.   
 
Literature shows that several studies have utilized general equilibrium models to 
examine the distributional effects of tax evasion. Watson (1985) develops a model 
with two labor markets characterized by differing evasion possibilities, in order to 
examine changes in various tax parameters on evasion and labor market 
equilibrium.  The analysis of both proportional and progressive taxation reveals that 
the gains that might accrue to those who are better able to avoid detection are 
partially offset by wage declines in markets in which evasion is possible, so that 
                                                 
1The advantage of tax evasion can also be dissipated away by direct means, for instance the bribing of corrupt officials (Shah 
& Whalley, 1990). 
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market forces tend to eliminate the value of any advantage created by the presence 
of evasion opportunities.  
 
Kesselman (1989) develops an intersectoral general equilibrium model of income tax 
evasion.  Qualitative and quantitative assessments of the effects of tax rate changes 
on evasion activity, relative output prices, and real tax revenues yield an array of 
findings.  For instance the inducement toward more or less evasion requires 
changes in the relative prices of outputs from both the evading and compliant 
sectors, which suggests that the gains from evasion may be shifted from the evaders 
to the consumers of their output via lower prices. This indicates therefore that the 
evaders may bear most of the evasion costs, but the marginal evader may not gain 
from evasion.  
 
However, though these two studies use general equilibrium models to examine the 
distributional effects of tax evasion, there are some key features that should 
characterize general equilibrium models of tax evasion. Martinez-Vazquez (1996) 
enumerates these desirable features.  
 
First, the model should be able to capture the potential general equilibrium effects of 
tax evasion. The general equilibrium effects induce (potential) changes in the 
relative prices of both factors of production and goods and services brought about by 
market equilibrium forces. If there is an advantage in terms of expected factor 
income or firms’ expected profits, the (potential) mobility of resources will lead to the 
necessary price adjustments until this advantage is eliminated. 
 
Second, the model should incorporate the element of uncertainty in an individual’s 
decision to evade in at least one sector of the economy. This fundamental 
distinguishing characteristic of evasion incidence, as opposed to tax incidence, 
allows the excess burdens of evasion associated with uncertainty to be accounted 
for in the model. 9 
 
Third, the model should allow for varying degrees of competition or entry across 
sectors in the economy, including those in which tax evasion is prevalent. This 
includes mobility of factors, for instance labor in the case of income tax evasion; it 
also includes firm entry in several sectors, as in the case of sales tax or corporate 
income tax evasion. The element of mobility is critical to an understanding of how 
much of the tax advantage may be retained by the initial evaders and how much is 
shifted via factor and commodity price changes. 
 
Failure to accommodate these effects can lead to misleading conclusions. For 
instance Skinner and Slemrod (1985) argue that, if labor income is more likely to be 
generated in the untaxed sector than capital income, then the existence of tax 
evasion makes the tax system more progressive. To the extent that the advantages 
realized by workers get capitalized or competed away by market processes, this 
conclusion is incorrect. The non-payment of tax by domestic helpers, for instance, 
may actually benefit higher-income households who use these services because 
these households pay lower prices for the domestic services.  
 
In summary therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the incidence of tax evasion 
requires the consideration of the three general equilibrium effects, accounting for 
uncertainty and varying degrees of mobility across sectors. In particular, the key 
phenomenon that any model should explain is the extent to which any advantage of 
tax evasion gets capitalized or competed away via price changes, including the 
identification of gainers and losers from this process.  This study utilizes these 
guidelines to develop a framework for examining the distribution effects of tax 
evasion in Uganda with emphasis on gainers and loosers. 
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4.0 Objectives of the Study 
 
4.1 General Objective 
 
This study seeks to examine the various options of expanding the tax base by 
reducing tax evasion and targeting the informal sector which largely does not pay 
taxes. This will provide also an assessment of the general and macroeconomic 
effects of undertaking such reforms. 
 
4.2 Specific Objectives 
 
In particular, this study seeks to assess: 
 
i.  The implications of widening the tax base on the informal sector; 
ii.  The general equilibrium effects of reducing tax burden on the overtaxed 
sectors while introducing the new taxes in new sectors; 
iii.  The implications of reducing tax evasion and the implied reduction on the 
financing requirement that could lead to crowding-out effects. 




5.0   Significance of the Study 
 
There is no study that has attempted to look at the various options of widening the 
tax base and its macroeconomic implications.  
 
As such, this study will provide information on key decision variables that will be 
used to inform policy aimed widening the tax base without necessarily increasing the 
tax burden. The study will also inform policy makers on how tax evasion could be 11 
 
minimized by reducing taxes on some over taxed sectors while introducing taxes in 




6.1  The Uganda Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 2007 
A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is a table which summarizes the economic 
activities of all agents in the economy. These agents typically include households, 
enterprises, government, and the rest of the world (ROW). The relationships 
included in the SAM include purchase of inputs (goods and services, imports, labour, 
land, capital etc.); production of commodities; payment of wages, interest rent and 
taxes; and savings and investment. Like other conventional SAMs, the Uganda SAM 
is based on a block of production activities, involving factors of production, 
households, government, stocks and the rest of the world.   
 
The Uganda SAM is a 120 by 120 matrix.  The various commodities (domestic 
production) supplied are purchased and used by households for final consumption 
(42 per cent of the total), but also a considerable proportion (34 per cent) is 
demanded and used by producers as intermediate inputs. Only 7 percent of 
domestic production is exported, while 11 per cent is used for investment and stocks 
and the remaining 7 percent is used by government for final consumption. 
Households derive 64 per cent of their income from factor income payments, while 
the rest accrues from government, inter-household transfers, corporations and the 
rest of the world. The government earns 32 percent of its income from import tariffs 
– a relatively high proportion, but a characteristic typical of developing countries. It 
derives 42 percent of its income from the ROW, which includes international aid and 
interest. The remainder of government’s income is derived from taxes on products 




Investment finance is sourced more or less equally from government (26 per cent), 
domestic producers (27 per cent) and households (26 per cent), with enterprises 
providing only 21 per cent.  Imports of goods and services account for 87 percent of 
total expenditure to the ROW. The rest is paid to ROW by domestic household 
sectors in form of remittances; wage labour from domestic production activity; 
domestic corporations payments of dividends; income transfers paid by government; 
and net lending and external debt related payments.  
 
The extent of household dis-aggregation is very important for policy analysis, and 
involves representative household groups as opposed to individual households. 
Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976) argue persuasively for a household dis-aggregation that 
minimizes within-group heterogeneity. This is achieved in the Uganda SAM through 
the disaggregating of households by rural and urban, and whether households are 
involved in farming or non farming activities. 
 
The Uganda SAM identifies three labour categories disaggregated by skilled, 
unskilled and self employed. Land and capital are distributed accordingly to the 
various household groups. 
 
6.2  Salient Features of the CGE Model 
The CGE model used in the present study is based on a standard CGE model 
developed by Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002). This is a real model without the 
financial or banking system (See Table A1). It cannot be used to forecast inflation. 
The CGE model is calibrated to the 2007 SAM. GAMS software is used to calibrate 
the model and perform the simulations. 
 
Productions and commodities 
For all activities, producers maximize profits given their technology and the prices of 
inputs and output. The production technology is a two-step nested structure. At the 
bottom level, primary inputs are combined to produce value-added using a CES 
(constant elasticity of substitution) function. At the top level, aggregated value added 13 
 
is then combined with intermediate input within a fixed coefficient (Leontief) function 
to give the output. The profit maximization gives the demand for intermediate goods, 
labour and capital demand. The detailed disaggregation of production activities 
captures the changing structure of growth due to the pandemic. 
 
The allocation of domestic output between exports and domestic sales is determined 
using the assumption that domestic producers maximize profits subject to imperfect 
transformability between these two alternatives. The production possibility frontier of 
the economy is defined by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function 
between domestic supply and export. 
On the demand side, a composite commodity is made up of domestic demand and 
final imports and it is consumed by households, enterprises, and government. The 
Armington assumption is used here to distinguish between domestically produced 
goods and imports. For each good, the model assumes imperfect substitutability 
(CES function) between imports and the corresponding composite domestic goods. 
The parameter for CET and CES elasticity used to calibrate the functions used in the 
CGE model are exogenously determined.  
 
Factor of production 
There are 6 primary inputs: 3 labour types, capital, cattle and land. Wages and 
returns to capital are assumed to adjust so as to clear all the factor markets. 
Unskilled and self-employed labor is mobile across sectors while capital is assumed 
to be sector-specific. 
 
Institutions 
There are three institutions in the model:, households, enterprises and government. 
Households receive their income from primary factor payments. They also receive 
transfers from government and the rest of the world. Households pay income taxes 
and these are proportional to their incomes. Savings and total consumption are 
assumed to be a fixed proportion of household’s disposable income (income after 
income taxes). Consumption demand is determined by a Linear Expenditure System 14 
 
(LES) function. Firms receive their income from remuneration of capital; transfers 
from government and the rest of the world; and net capital transfers from 
households. Firms pay corporate tax to government and these are proportional to 
their incomes. 
Government revenue is composed of direct taxes collected from households and 
firms, indirect taxes on domestic activities, domestic value added tax, tariff revenue 
on imports, factor income to the government, and transfers from the rest of the 
world. The government also saves and consumes. 
 
Macro closure 
Equilibrium in a CGE model is captured by a set of macro closures in a model. Aside 
from the supply-demand balances in product and factor markets, three 
macroeconomic balances are specified in the model: (i) fiscal balance, (ii) the 
external trade balance, and (iii) savings-investment balance. For fiscal balance, 
government savings is assumed to adjust to equate the different between 
government revenue and spending. For external balance, foreign savings are fixed 
with exchange rate adjustment to clear foreign exchange markets. For savings-
investment balance, the model assumes that savings are investment driven and 
adjust through flexible saving rate for firms. Alternative closures, described later, are 
used in a subset of the model simulations. 
 
Recursive Dynamics 
To appropriately capture the dynamic aspects of aid on the economy, this model is 
extended by building some recursive dynamics by adopting the methodology used in 
previous studies on Botswana and South Africa (Thurlow, 2007). The dynamics is 
captured by assuming that investments in the current period are used to build on the 
new capital stock for the next period. The new capital is allocated across sectors 
according to the profitability of the various sectors. The labour supply path under 
different policy scenarios is exogenously provided from a demographic model. The 
model is initially solved to replicate the SAM of 2007. 
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7.0      Extent of Tax Evasion 
Using the information from the social accounting matrix, it’s revealed that tax 
collection is still way below relative to its tax base. Focusing on the indirect taxes or 
consumption taxes which include VAT, Table 2 shows that for most of the 
commodities, the effective tax rates computed are below the statutory rates. For 
instance, the statutory VAT is at 18 percent. However, for most commodities the 
ratio of taxes collected is very low. For all the commodities, it’s shown that less than 
5 percent of the tax base is collected. This could be a reflection of two problems: 
first, there could be rampant tax evasion within the tax system. Second, it might be 
the case that the revenue authority is still too weak to effectively capture the 
statutory taxes in the economy. For the case of imports, a different pattern is 
portrayed where most of the commodities imported indeed meet their statutory tax 
payments. For the cases like fertilizers where the ratio is less than the statutory rates 
there is deliberate government policies not to over tax those commodities. This 
background clearly indicated that there is more work to do for the URA to improve on 
its domestic tax collections. In addition, some imports including fuel are overtaxed 
and given the importance of this commodity for other sectors like manufacturing and 
services especially transport, this could impact the economy negatively. Therefore, 
by improving domestic tax collection this would create room for reduction of taxes on 
commodities like fuel. 
 
The other main source of revenues is the direct taxes which include corporate taxes 
on enterprises and income taxes on individuals. In this case, we mainly focus on the 
income taxes imposed on individuals because of the data available. Table 3 shows 
that the bulk of the income taxes are paid by households residing in Kampala. This 
is partly explained by the fact that the majority of the formal jobs are indeed in 
Kampala. This includes government workers and formally registered enterprises. 
However, while upcountry there are also government establishments and there are 
also some enterprises based upcountry, it’s revealed that the tax collection 
upcountry is still very low relative to the total income of households especially those 
residing in the urban areas. Tax collection for the rural households is also very weak. 16 
 
However, a case can be made on equity grounds that the poor are largely residing in 




Commodity Indirect Taxes (millions)Total consumption (mill Taxes Collected (%) Import duties (millions) Import Values (millions)Duties Collected (%)
Maize 282 335,648 0.1 56 61,833 0.1
Rice 100,697 0.0 359 24,911 1.4
Other cereals 3,006 442,805 0.7 553 155,347 0.4
Cassava 12,403 610,780 2.0 … … …
Irish potato 3,948 214,679 1.8 … … …
Sweet potato 4,091 464,289 0.9 … … …
M a t o k e … 0 ………
Oilseeds … 12,306 0.0 … … …
Beans 3,532 167,898 2.1 11 10,243 0.1
Vegetable 17,439 736,810 2.4 … … …
Fruits & other tree crops 1,445 35,136 4.1 … … …
F l o w e r s ……… ………
C o t t o n ……… ………
T o b a c c o ……… ………
Coffee 18,879 693,751 2.7 … … …
Tea, cocoa & vanilla 2,135 63,033 3.4 751 6,165 12.2
Cattle & sheep 422,060 0.0 … … …
Poultry 1,715 66,521 2.6 … … …
Other livestock 77,164 0.0 115 1,920 6.0
Forestry 24,785 1,317,249 1.9 … … …
Fisheries 6,391 579,885 1.1 … … …
Mining 4,344 191,415 2.3 9,088 67,917 13.4
Meat processing 36,093 590,925 6.1 360 58,281 0.6
Fish processing 6,323 210,691 3.0 1,222 40,100 3.0
Grain processing 52,925 1,981,416 2.7 31,537 309,941 10.2
Feed stock 22,745 856,446 2.7 10,428 78,904 13.2
Other food processing 102,648 0.0 … … …
Beverages & tobacco 60,448 1,631,834 3.7 11,082 73,406 15.1
Textiles & clothing 51,880 974,501 5.3 53,374 270,386 19.7
Wood & paper 245,492 0.0 19,578 92,753 21.1
Petrol & diesel 27,718 1,193,748 2.3 483,071 600,146 80.5
Fertilizer 63,484 1,628,551 3.9 52,259 668,975 7.8
Other chemicals 8,514 230,892 3.7 18,154 143,348 12.7
Machinery & equipment 9,307 1,287,724 0.7 96,138 533,539 18.0
Furniture 21,491 2,080,779 1.0 252,445 2,162,666 11.7
Other manufacturing 7,646 158,382 4.8 4,527 30,325 14.9
Energy & water 32,139 1,090,077 2.9 … … …
Construction 20,781 967,947 2.1 … … …
Trade 4,671 4,127,879 0.1 … … …
Hotels & catering 5,474 129,729 4.2 … … …
Transport 63,909 2,360,061 2.7 … 1,472,148 …
Communications 20,595 911,756 2.3 … 27,937 …
Banking 536 475,845 0.1 … 130,019 …
Real estate 12,452 2,349,390 0.5 … … …
Community services 1,855 770,884 0.2 71 246,599 0.0
Other private services … 2,473 0.0 … … …
Research & development … 24,814 0.0 … … …
Public administration … 1,453,989 0.0 … … …
Education … 369,595 0.0 … … …
Health 24,431 467,716 5.2 … … …
Table 2: Tax Collection and Tax Base Derived from the SAM17 
 
 
Given that the informal sector is very difficult to target and collect taxes, government 
introduced a local service tax which would be a source of revenue especially for the 
local governments. The service tax is to be levied on wealth and incomes of people 
currently falling in the brackets of direct taxes collected by the central government. 
The service tax is a direct tax on incomes of taxpayers and in principle falls in the 
same category as income tax collected by Uganda Revenue Authority.  
The tax is also levied on informal activities like small hotels where its added as a 
surcharge to the hotel bill. This has various implications on the activities where its 
levied in terms of service delivery.  
 
7.1  Sources of Untapped Tax Revenues 
 
Using the household surveys, this paper attempts to identify areas that are largely 
untapped or where tax evasion is considered to be rampant. The household survey 
has a section which captures the activities of the household during the past year. 
These activities range from agriculture, fishing, mining, manufacturing, construction, 
wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, communication, real 
estate, education (private schools), health services (clinics and drug stores) and 
other services like saloons. 
 
While it’s difficult to target these small and informal enterprises, by effectively 
implementing the presumptive tax the government could be able to collect more 
revenues. This tax is levied on a turnover of less than or equal to 50 million Uganda 
Households Income Tax (mill) Total Income (mill) Tax Collected(%)
Rural farm 50,106                  4,695,186              1.07
Rural non-farm 33,670                  954,396                 3.53
Kampala metro 234,007                1,249,676              18.73
Urban farm 35,768                  882,176                 4.05
Urban non-farm 41,706                  711,087               5.87
Table 3: Households Income Taxes18 
 
shillings. It mainly covers small businesses, because any business with a turnover of 
above 50 million is considered a corporation. These small businesses are 
associated with inability to keeping proper records, hence unlike corporate taxes; 
these firms are taxed without adjusting for deductions of expenditures and losses.  
 
Table 4: Presumptive tax 
 
Income Tax on MOF Schedule    
From To  Rate(Ug.Shs) 
- 5,000,000.00  0 
5,000,001.00 20,000,000.00  100,000.00 
20,000,001.00 30,000,000.00 250,000.00 
30,000,001.00 40,000,000.00 350,000.00 
40,000,001.00 50,000,000.00 450,000.00 
 
By using the above schedule we derive the potential presumptive tax revenues that 
can be collected. The total additional revenue that can be collected is estimated at 
USHS 53 billions. The largest contribution that is largely untaxed is the retail and 
whole sale trade.  Unfortunately, the businesses involved in retail trade and some 
whole sale trade are not formally registered businesses. They would therefore not be 
VAT registered neither would they be paying corporate tax on their profits or income 
tax for their employees. Combined with these businesses not keeping records, it 
becomes very difficult to target this group. 
 
Fishing 1,963                
Mining and quarrying 254                   
Manufacturing 4,793                
Whole Sale 11,060              
Retail Trade 23,310              
Leasing Machinery 334                   
Hotels and Restaurants 4,391                
Transport 3,376                
Financial Intermediation 29                     
ICT (Internet Cafes) 209                   
Professional services (consultants, lawyers, etc.) 830                   
Construction Activities 588                   
Education (Schools) 427                   
Health (Drug shops and clinics) 1,437                
Entertainment 163                   
Other services (Saloons etc) 290                   
Total 53,454              
Potential Revenues Untapped (Million Shs)19 
 
7. 2   Simulations 
 
The previous section provides the basis for our simulations. The objective of these 
simulations is to find how revenues can be raised without necessary affecting the 
growth of the economy and exacerbating equity within household groups. The first 
simulation investigates the possibility of increasing domestic revenues. Since all 
commodities are generally under taxed, we first run a simulation (CTAX) where the 
tax effort (or revenue collection) is improved by 10 percent every year.
2 The key 
aspects that we are interested in this simulation are the impact of consumption, 
production and equity of households. From the consumption side, increased revenue 
collection on consumption items would have some redistributive implications. We 
note that households which are largely rural and involved in farming would be most 
affected. Over the simulation period of five years, consumption for rural households 
would be lower than the baseline by 0.5 percent. The intuition behind this result is 
that while attempting to increase domestic taxes, this has to be done selectively by 
focusing more on goods that are mainly consumed by the rich.  
 
From the macroeconomic perspective, this simulation shows that the overall deficit 
would be reduced by 3 percent in the baseline. This would have various implications 
at the macroeconomic level. First, with the reduced borrowing requirement, this 
would imply that the government would borrow less from the domestic market and 
hence put less pressure on interest rates. Indeed private investments increase by 
2.6 percent over the simulation period. 
                                                 
2 Note that for these simulations, we are not changing the statutory tax rates. Rather, we assume that the revenue 
authority would improve on its administration which would subsequently result into higher revenues collected. 20 
 
 
From the equity perspective, all households would be affected increasing the 
consumption tax collection effort. However, the households that would be most 
affected are the ones in the rural areas. 
 
The second simulation (CTAXNF) focuses on the case where all food items are 
excluded from higher tax collection. In general, food items make the largest 
composition of the consumption basket for poor households. For most of the food 
items, they are exempted from VAT. However, processed foods which are largely 
sold through supermarkets are subject to taxes. The processed foods are generally 
consumed by the richer households especially those based in the urban areas. In 
the simulation, we only exclude food items that are not processed. The impact of this 
simulation is similar to the previous case although the magnitudes differ. In 
particular, the consumption of households that are rural based would not be as 
negatively affected like in the previous simulation. The expenditure equivalent 
variation measure which captures the consumption foregone by all groups is much 














less compared to the previous simulation. This suggests that the policy stance of 
improving tax collections while excluding the food items would be more progressive. 
 
Direct Taxes  
Given that the local service tax (LST) is mainly targeted to individuals who are not 
captured under the income tax category, we run a simulation where we apply the 
thresholds on households which are based in the urban areas (HHUFTAX). The 
households identified paying the lowest income taxes are those in urban areas 
excluding Kampala and all households in rural areas. These households are largely 
involved in informal sector activities. While it can be argued on equity grounds that 
these households tend to be poorer, there are households which are fully captured 
in the income tax category with equal or less income than the informal sector 
workers. For instance, Teachers and Policemen earn on average less than UG 
400,000 shillings a month which is taxed. However, there are many informal 
business owners who make a profit that is much higher than the average salary of 
these two categories. Hence, URA should make a deliberate effort to capture this 




In one of the simulations we increase the tax collection effort by the URA among the 
households which are urban and not involved in farming activities (HHUNFTAX). 
These households usually involve individuals who are running small businesses like 
shops or petty traders. This simulation would result into a reduction of the welfare of 
the households targeted. However, the welfare for all the other households improves 
relative to the baseline and indication that they are not overburdened by the tax 
system. There are also households which are involved in farming but residing in 
urban areas. Some of these households would typically have farms which are not 
only for subsistence. Increasing the tax collection effort among this group would 
reduce their welfare but the welfare of the households residing in Kampala would 
improve. This suggests that indeed Kampala residents could be overburdened by 
the income tax system. By rolling the tax system out to other urban centers in the 
form of the LST would reduce the burden of Kampala financing the Local 
Governments upcountry.  















8.0  Conclusions and Policy Conclusions 
From the basic analysis it’s been found that Uganda still lags way behind in its tax 
collections at the domestic level. For most of the commodities the tax collection 
effort is not more than 5 percent relative to the statutory rate of 18 percent. This 
results into a situation where the government has to rely a lot on foreign financing. 
From the analysis, there is a lot of improvement where URA can be able to increase 
its tax effort.  The paper identifies specific areas which URA should target to improve 
its tax collection. We estimate a total of 53 billion shillings which is untapped. This 
could be achieved by targeting businesses, commodities that are under-taxed and 
excluding food items for equity purposes. Increasing domestic tax collection would 
also result into less overreliance on taxing a few commodities especially fuel which 
is interlinked with a lot of other sectors and could indeed harm growth in the long-
run. We also find that the tax effort on imports is sufficient. However, import duties 
on fuel remain very high and this could be a symptom of the poor domestic tax 
collection.  
 
To identify the small informal businesses, it would require implementation of the 
National Identity where an individual or business (small or big) can easily be tracked. 
In addition, URA would need to undertake a special survey to establish the potential 
revenue that is not currently tapped. While the current household surveys have 
some information, it’s not very sufficient as such surveys are known for respondents 
under reporting their income or exaggerating their costs. 
 
For the income taxes, we also find that there is much room for improvement by the 
URA. The bulk of this tax is being paid by the Kampala residents. In essence, with 
the abolition of the graduated income tax (which was a poll tax for every Ugandan), 
this implies that largely the tax base financing the local governments is around 
Kampala. While there are arguments that this is where richer households and bigger 
enterprises are located, an effort should be made to expand the tax base beyond 
Kampala. Introducing the LST is a step in that direction. We find that the targeted 24 
 
households with this LST would lose in welfare, but other households’ welfare not 
paying the LST would improve an indication that the tax burden would be less.  25 
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Table A1 continued. CGE model sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol Explanation 
Greek Symbols     
  Efficiency parameter in the 
CES activity function 
t
cr δ   CET function share 
parameter 
  Efficiency parameter in the 
CES value-added function 
 
CES value-added function 
share parameter for factor f 
in activity a 
 




Subsistence consumption of 
marketed commodity c for 
household h 
  Armington function shift 
parameter 
  Yield of output c per unit of 
activity a 
  CET function shift parameter         CES production function 
exponent 
a β  
Capital sectoral mobility 
factor 
  CES value-added function 
exponent 
 
Marginal share of 
consumption spending on 






  CES activity function share 
parameter 
  Armington function exponent 
 
Share parameter for 
domestic commodity 
aggregation function 
  CET function exponent 
q
cr δ   Armington function share 
parameter 
a
fat η   Sector share of new capital 
f υ   Capital depreciation rate     
Exogenous Variables     
  Consumer price index    
Savings rate scaling factor (= 
0 for base) 
 
Change in domestic 
institution tax share  (= 0 for 
base; exogenous variable) 
  Quantity supplied of factor 
   Foreign savings (FCU)   
Direct tax scaling factor (= 0 





Wage distortion factor for 
factor f in activity a 
  Investment adjustment factor     
Endogenous Variables     
a
ft AWF  
Average capital rental rate in 
time period t 
  Government consumption 
demand for commodity 





































DMPS ch QH28 
 
institution savings rates (= 0 
for base; exogenous 
variable) 
commodity c by household h 
 
Producer price index for 
domestically marketed output
 
Quantity of household home 
consumption of commodity c 
from activity a for household 
h 
  Government expenditures    Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input 
  Consumption spending for 
household 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
intermediate input to activity 
a 
 
Exchange rate (LCU  per unit 
of FCU) 
  Quantity of investment 
demand for commodity 
  Government savings  cr QM   Quantity of imports of 
commodity c 
  Quantity demanded of factor 
f from activity a    
 
Table A1 continued. CGE model sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol Explanation 
Endogenous Variables Continued     
 
Marginal propensity to 




Quantity of goods 
supplied to domestic 
market (composite 
supply) 
  Activity price (unit gross 
revenue) 
  
Quantity of commodity 
demanded as trade 
input 
 
Demand price for 
commodity produced 
and sold domestically 
  Quantity of (aggregate) 
value-added 
 
Supply price for 
commodity produced 
and sold domestically 
 
Aggregated quantity of 
domestic output of 
commodity 
cr PE   Export price (domestic 
currency) 
  
Quantity of output of 
commodity c from 
activity a 
  Aggregate intermediate 
input price for activity a 
f RWF   Real average factor 
price 
ft PK  
Unit price of capital in 
time period t     Total nominal 
absorption 
cr PM   Import price (domestic 
currency) 
 
Direct tax rate for 








i MPS c QQ
a PA c QT
c PDD a QVA










institution i’ to i (both in 
the set INSDNG) 
 
Value-added price 
(factor income per unit 
of activity) 
  Average price of factor 
  Aggregate producer 
price for commodity 
  Income of factor f 
 
Producer price of 
commodity c for activity 
a 
  Government revenue 
  Quantity (level) of 
activity 
 







  Income to domestic 
institution i from factor f
cr QE   Quantity of exports 
a
fat K Δ  
Quantity of new capital 
by activity a for time 
period t 
 
c PQ ' ii TRII
a PVA f WF
c PX f YF
ac PXAC YG
a QA i YI
c QD if YIF30 
 
Table A2. CGE model equations 
Production and Price Equations 
   





=⋅ ∑   (2) 
()












=⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟






aa va vaf va vaf
fa f a a f af a f a f af a f a
fF







⋅= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟


















⎝⎠ ∑   (5) 
1
1
' ' '' '' ' '
''
van van
fa fa van van
f f a f fa fa ff a f a ff a f a
fF






⋅= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑   (6) 
aa a QVA iva QA =⋅  (7) 
aa a QINTA inta QA =⋅   (8) 
(1 ) aa a a a a a PA ta QA PVA QVA PINTA QINTA ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅   (9) 
ac ac a QXAC QA θ =⋅   (10)



























c a c c a ca c a ca c
aA






⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑   (13)
'
'
cr cr c c c
cC T
PE pwe EXR PQ ice
∈





cc r c r cc rc
rr





























Table A3. CGE model equations (continued) 
cc r c
r
 = QD QE QX +∑   (17)
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Institutional Incomes and Domestic Demand Equations 
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aA
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c c QG  =GADJ qg ⋅   (35)32 
 
 
Table A3. CGE Model Equations (continued) 
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System Constraints and Macroeconomic Closures 
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